54

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QUARTERLY ESTIMATE OF THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC JULY-SEPTEMBER 1957

CIA/RR IP-570

4 November 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Office of Research and Reports

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FOREWORD

This report is the tenth in a series to be issued on a quarterly basis summarizing production of aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The estimates presented are issued to satisfy the request of consumers for the most recent estimates of production of aircraft in the Bloc and are intended to supersede those contained in previous ORR publications. Changes in the present estimate from past estimates are the results of more recent intelligence information. 25X1B

25X1B [redacted] No interagency coordination has been attempted, and no dissemination of this report outside CIA is planned.

CONTENTS

Tables

Charts

CIA/RR IP-570
(ORR Project 33.1921)

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QUARTERLY ESTIMATE OF THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC JULY-SEPTEMBER 1957*

1. Trends in Production.

In the third quarter of 1957, estimated production of aircraft, by number, in the Sino-Soviet Bloc decreased approximately 12 percent from production in the previous quarter.** In terms of airframe weight, a decrease of about 6 percent was noted in Bloc production from the second quarter of 1957. These decreases were a result of lowered production of fighter aircraft occasioned by plant changeovers to production of newer types of fighters. Slightly more than 44 percent of the aircraft produced by the Bloc during the third quarter of 1957 are believed to have been combat types.***

2. Production in the USSR.

The Soviet share of estimated total production by the Sino-Soviet Bloc during the third quarter of 1957 decreased about 5 percent from that of the previous quarter.**** Of the 1,700 aircraft estimated to have been produced by the Bloc in the third quarter of 1957, about 1,300 aircraft, or approximately 75 percent, were produced in the USSR. About 90 percent of the estimated total production of aircraft in the Bloc, by airframe weight, took place in the USSR, again indicating that the Satellites produce relatively lighter aircraft than the USSR. Of the estimated total production of combat aircraft in the Bloc during the third quarter of 1957, almost 87 percent is believed to have been produced in the USSR.

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* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 October 1957.

** Estimated production of aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc from 1955 through the third quarter of 1957 is given by number in Table 1, p. 6, below, and by airframe weight in Table 2, p. 7, below.

*** For the purposes of this report, combat types include bomber, fighter, and ground-attack aircraft. Other aircraft such as helicopters and transports have uses under both combat and noncombat conditions.

**** Estimated production of aircraft in the USSR from 1955 through the third quarter of 1957 is given by number in Table 3, p. 8, below, and by airframe weight in Table 4, p. 9, below.

It is estimated that total US production of combat aircraft during the third quarter of 1957 exceeded that of the USSR by almost 30 percent in terms of numbers and by about 32 percent in terms of airframe weight. Decreased production of fighter aircraft in the USSR accounts for most of the difference in favor of the US.*

Recent intelligence information has made several major changes necessary in previously published estimates of Soviet production of aircraft. Analysis of information from plant sightings at Moscow Airframe Plant No. 23 indicates that probably 8 Bisons were produced at the plant during the first quarter of 1957, 9 during the second quarter, and 9 during the third quarter. Although the estimated cumulative production of 74 Bisons** has not changed as a result of these sightings, there is a change in the previously published estimate stating that 9 Bisons were produced during the first quarter of 1957 and 8 during the second quarter. Observation of the plant airfield on 24 September 1957 revealed one Bison with a short nose and a dihedral in the horizontal stabilizer. This observation is the first evidence of a possible change in configuration since June 1956. Although little intelligence is available regarding the Bear (Tu-95) heavy turboprop bomber, production of the Bear is estimated to be continuing at the rate of six aircraft per quarter at Kuybyshev Airframe Plant No. 18. Estimated cumulative production of the Bear is now 57 aircraft. Production of the Badger (Tu-16) jet medium bomber is believed to be continuing at a constant rate at Kuybyshev Airframe Plant No. 1 and at Kazan' Airframe Plant No. 22. Production of the Badger at Voronezh Airframe Plant No. 64 is believed to have ceased during the third quarter of 1957. Observation of the Voronezh East Airfield on 29 August 1957 revealed no aircraft in the area. In addition, Voronezh Airframe Plant No. 64 is believed to have initiated series production of a new transport and therefore should have phased out production of Badger aircraft.

The increased emphasis placed by the USSR on the development of transport aircraft again was apparent in July 1957 when four new-type transports were exhibited at Vnukovo Airfield in Moscow. Of these,

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* Production of combat aircraft in the USSR from 1955 through the third quarter of 1957 is compared with that in the US by number in Figure 1, inside back cover, and by airframe weight in Figure 2, inside back cover. For additional comparison, US military acceptances from 1955 through the third quarter of 1957 are given by number in Table 6, p. 11, below, and by airframe weight in Table 7, p. 12, below.

** Estimated cumulative production of selected Soviet aircraft through the third quarter of 1957 is given in Table 5, p. 10, below.

two are believed to be currently in series production in the USSR -- the Tu-104A tourist version of the 2-engine jet transport Camel (Tu-104) and the 4-engine turboprop transport Cat (Ukraina). It is estimated that the Tu-104A is in production at Omsk Airframe Plant No. 166 and at Khar'kov Airframe Plant No. 135, both of these plants having been identified previously as production sites for Camel aircraft. [redacted] Voronezh Airframe Plant No. 64, which reportedly was to begin production of transport aircraft in 1957, is estimated to have begun series production of a new type of transport, possibly the Cat, in July 1957. Seven prototypes of the Cat are estimated to have been completed at Kiev Airframe Plant No. 473 by the end of the third quarter of 1957. The 4-engine jet transport Cooker (Tu-110) and the 4-engine turboprop transport Coot (Il-18) also were exhibited at Vnukovo, but neither is believed to be in series production as of 1 October 1957. 25X1B

The prototype of the Coot reportedly was constructed at Moscow Airframe Plant No. 30. Because analysis [redacted] indicates that Moscow Airframe Plant No. 30 probably has decreased its output of the Crate (Il-14) piston transport in the past year, it is possible that the plant may be preparing for series production of the Coot.

Recent sightings at Rostov Airframe Plant No. 168 confirm that the plant is not engaged in production of aircraft. A report of August 1957 described the factory airfield as "disused" and the assembly area buildings as closed. Observation of Rostov Airframe Plant No. 168 in September 1957 revealed no change within the plant area or in the condition of the airfield. Production of the Fresco (MIG-17) jet fighter at Tbilisi Airframe Plant No. 31 is estimated to have ceased during the second quarter of 1957. Two recent observations of the plant area and the adjoining airfield have revealed apparent inactivity at the plant and no aircraft on the airfield. It is estimated that Tbilisi Airframe Plant No. 31 has begun series production of a new type of fighter, probably of Mikoyan design. No observations have been made of Gor'kiy Airframe Plant No. 21 since May 1957. At that time, 12 swept-tail fighter-size aircraft were glimpsed in the plant area. Although the impression was that these aircraft were Farmers (MIG-19's), the observer could not rule out the possibility that they might have been a new type of aircraft such as the Fitter or the Faceplate. Since series production of some of the new jet fighters which were shown for the first time at the Tushino Air Show of June 1956 has long been expected in Soviet

airframe plants, it is estimated that Gor'kiy Airframe Plant No. 21 also has started series production of a new jet fighter. Although not identified as to type, based on the past association of the plant with Mikoyan fighters, the aircraft probably is of Mikoyan design.

3. Production in the European Satellites and in Communist China.

In the third quarter of 1957 the European Satellites produced an estimated total of about 420 aircraft, or approximately 25 percent of the total production of aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.* Czechoslovakia and Poland are still the largest producers among the Satellites, accounting for about 70 percent and 20 percent, respectively, or a combined total of almost 91 percent of Satellite production of aircraft by number.

Numerous unconfirmed reports were received during the third quarter of 1957, allegedly revealing activities by the Czechoslovaks relating to the production of a more modern jet fighter than the Fagot (MIG-15). The Farmer (MIG-19) is the type most frequently mentioned in the reports. Although reliable observers have reported on what appears to be a reduction in the number of Fagots produced by the Prague/Vodochody jet fighter plant, no new type of aircraft has been observed at the plant. Until information is received which will clarify production activities at Vodochody, it is estimated that during the third quarter of 1957 the Czechoslovaks substantially reduced production of the Fagot. It is estimated that production of the Midget (U-MIG-15) jet trainer is continuing at previously estimated rates. Production of the Crate (Il-14) piston transport is believed to be continuing at a steadily accelerating rate.

Production of the Fresco (MIG-17) jet fighter at the Mielec Airframe Plant in Poland is estimated to have begun in November 1956. Although the plant had long been expected to enter the Fresco program, confirmatory intelligence was lacking until an observation of the plant in August 1957 revealed 12, and possibly 24, Frescos on the plant airfield. Production of Fagot aircraft at the plant is estimated to have ceased during the first quarter of 1957.

East German production of Crate transports during the third quarter of 1957 is estimated to have continued to be restricted by

* Estimated production of aircraft in the European Satellites from 1955 through the third quarter of 1957 is given by number in Table 8, p. 13, below, and by airframe weight in Table 9, p. 14, below.

slow deliveries of supplies and by difficulties in overcoming some technological obstacles. A modest expansion of plant facilities at the Dresden/Klotzsche Aircraft Plant, a Crate production site, is continuing. It is believed, however, that this expansion will not affect the rate of production of aircraft significantly in the foreseeable future.

Hungarian production of Max (Yak-18) trainers is estimated to have been resumed during the second quarter of 1957 after an interruption in production occasioned by the Hungarian uprising in October 1956. Production is estimated to have increased slightly during the third quarter of 1957.

Analysis of recent information indicates that Communist China probably has not been engaged in domestic production of aircraft. It was previously estimated that the facility of Nan-chang was producing the Max trainer. Subsequent information indicates that the activity at this facility probably was final assembly of parts supplied by the USSR rather than domestic production of the aircraft. It is believed that the Nan-chang plant is used currently as a repair facility for jet aircraft rather than as a production site. Little confirmed information concerning the jet aircraft industry of China has been received during the third quarter of 1957. The Chinese claimed to have exhibited large numbers of "China-made" jet aircraft on the 30th anniversary of the Peoples Liberation Army in August 1957. Although it is estimated that these aircraft probably were assembled rather than produced in China, it is believed that the Chinese Communists will produce the Fresco domestically before the end of 1957. Considering the high degree of interest in the aviation program in China and the repeated claims of production, however, it is possible that the Chinese actually may enter series production of the Fresco somewhat earlier.

Table 1

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by Number a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Units

Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Jet bomber					
Heavy	21	25	8	9	9
Medium	350	470	120	120	110
Light	790	330	64	44	18
Turboprop bomber					
Heavy	8	24	6	6	6
Jet fighter	3,800	3,300	880	830	600
Transport					
Jet	6	27	9	9	9
Turboprop	0	3	3	3	9
Piston	740	1,100	310	300	280
Trainer					
Jet	1,200	800	200	210	210
Piston	780	800	200	210	220
Other b/	400	500	150	180	210
Total	8,100	7,500	1,900	1,900	1,700

a. Figures are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.
b. Helicopters, gliders, seaplanes, and utility aircraft.

Table 2

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, by Weight a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

	Thousand Pounds of Airframe Weight				
Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Jet bomber					
Heavy	2,300	2,800	890	1,000	1,000
Medium	18,000	24,000	5,900	6,100	5,600
Light	14,000	6,000	1,200	800	330
Turboprop bomber					
Heavy	720	2,200	540	540	540
Jet fighter	29,000	30,000	8,200	7,800	6,000
Transport					
Jet	370	1,700	560	560	560
Turboprop	0	94	120	120	1,600
Piston	3,100	9,800	2,900	2,700	2,600
Trainer					
Jet	9,100	5,000	1,300	1,300	1,300
Piston	1,600	1,600	400	410	420
Other b/	4,000	3,900	920	960	890
Total	82,000	87,000	23,000	22,000	21,000

a. Figures include production of spare parts and are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.
b. Helicopters, gliders, seaplanes, and utility aircraft.

Table 3

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the USSR, by Number a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Units

Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Jet bomber					
Heavy	21	25	8	9	9
Medium	350	470	120	120	110
Light	790	330	64	44	18
Turboprop bomber					
Heavy	8	24	6	6	6
Jet fighter	3,200	2,900	790	720	500
Transport					
Jet	6	27	9	9	9
Turboprop	0	3	3	3	9
Piston	740	1,100	290	280	240
Trainer					
Jet	920	500	130	130	130
Piston	340	360	90	90	90
Other b/	380	400	120	130	130
Total	6,800	6,100	1,600	1,500	1,300

a. Figures are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.
b. Helicopters, gliders, and seaplanes.

Table 4

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the USSR, by Weight a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Thousand Pounds of Airframe Weight

Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Jet bomber					
Heavy	2,300	2,800	890	1,000	1,000
Medium	18,000	24,000	5,900	6,100	5,600
Light	14,000	6,000	1,200	800	330
Turboprop bomber					
Heavy	720	2,200	540	540	540
Jet fighter	26,000	27,000	7,600	7,100	5,300
Transport					
Jet	370	1,700	560	560	560
Turboprop	0	94	120	120	1,600
Piston	3,100	9,500	2,600	2,300	2,000
Trainer					
Jet	7,100	3,200	830	860	870
Piston	400	430	110	110	110
Other b/	4,000	3,800	870	890	760
Total	76,000	81,000	21,000	20,000	19,000

a. Figures include production of spare parts and are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.
b. Helicopters, gliders, and seaplanes.

Table 5

Estimated Cumulative Production of Selected Aircraft in the USSR a/
Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Units

Model	Type of Aircraft	Production to 1 October 1957
Badger	Jet medium bomber	1,300
Beagle	Jet light bomber	6,000
Bear	Turboprop heavy bomber	57 b/
Bison	Jet heavy bomber	74
Camel	Jet transport	60
Crate	Piston transport	850
Farmer	Jet fighter	2,500
Flashlight	Jet all-weather interceptor	1,700
Fresco	Jet fighter	10,000
Horse	Helicopter	43
Hound	Helicopter	590
New fighter	Jet fighter	14
New transport	Turboprop transport	18

a. Figures are rounded to two significant digits.
b. This figure includes seven prototypes seen in July 1955.

Table 6

US Military Aircraft Acceptances, by Number a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Units

Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957 b/
Bomber					
Heavy	34	75	32	35	55
Medium	530	505	67	50	48
Light	155	105	14	0	0
Ground attack	631	469	110	94	60
Fighter	4,017	2,656	604	728	677
Transport	536	362	47	56	54
Trainer	1,439	843	191	183	192
Other c/	701	1,098	296	311	373
Total	8,043	6,113	1,361	1,457	1,459

a. The source of these figures is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), Statistics Branch, US Military Aircraft Acceptances, 1953 - September 1957, Number and Airframe Weight, September 1957, CONFIDENTIAL.
b. Includes preliminary data for September 1957.
c. Helicopters, flying boats, amphibians, and lighter-than-air.

Table 7

US Military Aircraft Acceptances, by Weight a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Type of Aircraft	Thousand Pounds of Airframe Weight				
	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957 b/
Bomber					
Heavy	3,853	8,442	3,598	3,936	6,177
Medium	26,377	22,525	2,649	1,693	1,757
Light	2,724	1,975	268	0	0
Ground attack	6,034	4,803	985	1,061	911
Fighter	43,161	30,588	7,143	8,463	7,999
Transport	20,697	13,104	1,703	2,357	2,321
Trainer	7,453	3,283	867	832	963
Other c/	4,397	5,292	1,113	1,159	1,357
Total	114,696	90,012	18,326	19,501	21,485

a. The source of these figures is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics), Statistics Branch, US Military Aircraft Acceptances, 1953 - September 1957, Number and Airframe Weight, September 1957, CONFIDENTIAL.
b. Includes preliminary data for September 1957.
c. Helicopters, flying boats, amphibians, and lighter-than-air.

Table 8

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the European Satellites, by Number a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Units

Country	Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Czechoslovakia	Jet fighter	240	220	75	75	45
	Jet trainer	310	310	75	75	75
	Piston trainer	360	360	91	91	91
	Transport	0	13	12	15	24
	Other	22	96	30	40	60
Total		940	1,000	280	300	300
Poland	Jet fighter	330	260	23	36	55
	Piston trainer	36	36	9	9	9
	Light helicopter	0	10	4	9	21
Total		370	300	36	54	85
Rumania	Piston trainer	24	24	9	12	18
Hungary	Piston trainer	24	20	0	10	15
East Germany	Transport	0	5	3	6	6
Grand total		1,400	1,400	330	380	420

a. Figures are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.

Table 9

Estimated Production of Aircraft in the European Satellites, by Weight a/
1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

Thousand Pounds of Airframe Weight

Country	Type of Aircraft	1955	1956	1st Quarter of 1957	2d Quarter of 1957	3d Quarter of 1957
Czechoslovakia	Jet fighter	1,400	1,300	440	440	280
	Jet trainer	1,900	1,800	460	460	460
	Piston trainer	1,100	1,100	270	270	270
	Transport	0	220	210	260	410
	Other	33	140	41	51	70
Total		4,500	4,600	1,400	1,500	1,500
Poland	Jet fighter	2,000	1,500	160	270	410
	Piston trainer	37	37	9	9	9
	Light helicopter	0	28	11	25	58
Total		2,000	1,600	180	300	480
Rumania	Piston trainer	22	22	8	11	16
Hungary	Piston trainer	17	20	0	10	15
East Germany	Transport	0	86	52	100	100
Grand total		6,500	6,300	1,700	1,900	2,100

a. Figures include production of spare parts and are rounded to two significant digits. Totals are derived from unrounded figures and do not always agree with the sum of the rounded components.

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Figure 2

US[a] and USSR[b]

PRODUCTION OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT,[c] BY WEIGHT[d]

1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957

(Million pounds of airframe weight)



[a] *US totals include preliminary data for September 1957.*
[b] *USSR totals are rounded.*
[c] *Bombers and fighters.*
[d] *US figures do not include production of spare parts.*

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Figure 1

US[a] and USSR[b]

PRODUCTION OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT,[c] BY NUMBER

1955 Through the Third Quarter of 1957



[a] US totals include preliminary data for September 1957.
[b] USSR totals are rounded.
[c] Bombers and fighters.

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1 October 1957 (Date)

Title: QUARTERLY ESTIMATE OF THE PRODUCTION OF AIRCRAFT IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1957

25X1A

Author: [redacted]

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5. Has information on US military end products or manpower been used? Explain. Yes. US Military Aircraft Acceptances.

6. Has direct use been made of the intelligence or information of another agency. No

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a. Intelligence information gaps disclosed in this project are covered specifically in existing collection requirements. [ ]
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